Mistaken Identity: Evidence for Demand Characteristics in Tasks Assessing Identity Statements by Horowitz, Erin Jamie
UC Santa Barbara
UC Santa Barbara Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
Mistaken Identity: Evidence for Demand Characteristics in Tasks Assessing Identity 
Statements
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/98q6x641
Author
Horowitz, Erin Jamie
Publication Date
2015
 
Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
Santa Barbara 
 
 
Mistaken Identity: Evidence for Demand Characteristics in Tasks Assessing Identity 
Statements 
 
 
A Thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the  
requirements for the degree Master of Arts  
in Psychology 
 
by 
Erin Jamie Horowitz 
 
Committee in charge: 
Professor Tamsin German, Chair 
Professor Leda Cosmides 
Professor Michael Miller 
 
June 2016
 
 
The thesis of Erin Jamie Horowitz is approved. 
 
  ____________________________________________  
 Leda Cosmides 
 
  ____________________________________________  
 Michael Miller 
 
  ____________________________________________  
 Tamsin German, Committee Chair 
 
 
June 2015 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mistaken Identity: Evidence for Demand Characteristics in Tasks Assessing Identity 
Statements 
 
Copyright © 2015 
by 
Erin Jamie Horowitz 
 
 iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Mistaken Identity: Evidence for Demand Characteristics in Tasks Assessing Identity 
Statements 
by 
Erin Jamie Horowitz 
 
Recent research has argued that children’s understanding of false belief depends on a 
conceptual grasp of the distinction between “sense” and “reference”. One strand of evidence 
for this view is a correlation between false belief task performance and tasks assessing the 
ability to understand a statement indicating that a character described via two different 
descriptions is in fact the same person (“identity tasks”). The current experiment presented 
children ranging from 3-5 years of age with a false belief task along with standard versions 
of this identity task and a modified, “no-conflict” version in which the order of information 
presented removes a hypothesized pragmatic implication that the different descriptions refer 
to different entities. Results revealed equivalent performance across all three tasks in 
younger children, but among older children, the “no-conflict” version of the identity task 
was performed significantly better than the other two tasks. No reliable association between 
any tasks was observed in either age group. These results support the conclusions that: 1) 
identity statement tasks aimed at tapping the “sense-reference distinction” may include 
pragmatic as well as conceptual demands, and 2) the pragmatic performance demands 
inherent in identity tasks appear to stem from a different source than performance demands 
argued to afflict elicited measures of false belief understanding. 
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I. Introduction 
Theory of mind, or the ability to predict and explain others’ behavior in terms of their 
beliefs and desires, is integral to human social interaction. Over the last few decades, 
considerable debate has surrounded the precise nature of the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying this ability, particularly in terms of scope. One view, referred to here as the 
metarepresentational theory, purports that mental states are processed by a mechanism more 
broadly designed to process metarepresentations (see, e.g., Perner, 1991). An opposing view, 
referred to here as the theory of mind mechanism (ToMM) theory, advocates an innate 
mechanism specifically designed to process mental states (see, e.g., Leslie, 1994). The 
predictions made by each theory have shaped investigations into mental state reasoning 
across a vast array of areas in psychology. 
Within the field of developmental psychology, researchers have largely focused on 
determining the age at which children are first able to reason about others’ false beliefs, 
thereby demonstrating an understanding that mental states are dissociable from reality 
(Dennett, 1979). In a typical false belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wimmer 
& Perner, 1983), the child watches as a character, Sally, places a ball in her basket and then 
leaves the area. While she is gone, her friend Ann removes the ball from the basket and hides 
it in a box, at which point the child is asked where Sally will look for her ball when she 
returns. In order to pass the task, children must choose the location where Sally thinks the 
ball is located, as opposed to the ball’s actual location, thus attributing a false belief to Sally 
that is separate from their own true belief. There exists a well-documented tendency for 3-
year-olds to incorrectly select the actual location of the ball when asked to predict Sally’s 
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behavior; this error is typically resolved at around 4 years of age (for review see Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001). Not surprisingly, the two competing theories offer different 
explanations for this behavior, characterized in terms of competence (the conceptual 
understanding required to pass the task) and performance (the existence of unrelated 
cognitive skills that are required to pass the task).   
Proponents of the ToMM theory argue that conceptual understanding of mental states is 
masked by other performance demands inherent in the false belief task. Under this model, the 
ToMM generates specific mental states, and in cases where a prediction or explanation is 
required, an additional selection processor (the functions of which are not limited to the 
domain of mental state reasoning) then chooses the most reasonable mental state – typically 
one that reflects reality (Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004; Leslie & Polizzi, 2000). Because 
passing the false belief task requires the selection processor to inhibit its initial choice (the 
child’s own true belief about the location of the ball) in favor of a mental state that does not 
reflect reality (Sally’s false belief about the location of the ball), errors can be attributed to an 
inability to inhibit an otherwise more rational response, rather than a failure of the ability to 
process mental states (Friedman & Leslie, 2004; Leslie, German, & Polizzi, 2005). In support 
of the ToMM theory, past work has demonstrated that decreasing demands on the selection 
processor by asking children where the protagonist will “look first” increases performance in 
younger children (Surian & Leslie, 1999), while increasing demands by introducing the 
protagonist’s desire to avoid the object decreases performance in older children (Leslie & 
Polizzi, 2000). Beyond evidence for the masking effects of performance demands, further 
evidence for an early-developing ToMM has been provided by several studies, which have 
demonstrated (through measures of looking time and gaze direction) that 13-15 month-old 
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infants attribute false beliefs to a character with regards to the location of an object (Kovács, 
Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005).   
On the other side of the debate, proponents of the metarepresentational theory interpret 
performance on the false belief task as indicative of a conceptual understanding of 
metarepresentations (Perner, 1991; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). According to this 
theory, metarepresentational understanding hinges upon the ability to distinguish what is 
represented from how it is represented (Doherty & Perner, 1998). With regards to the false 
belief task, the child and Sally both have a belief about the location of the ball, but this belief 
is represented differently in each case: the child believes the ball is in the box, and Sally 
believes the ball is in the basket. Successful performance thus requires an understanding that 
the location of the ball (the “what”) can be represented in two different senses (the “how”); 
from there children must intentionally switch to Sally’s perspective in order to choose the 
correct sense (Perner & Roessler, 2012). In a broader sense, the metarepresentational theory 
predicts a similar performance pattern on false belief tasks and tasks that measure reasoning 
about non-mental representations, such as photographs and signs (Leekam, Perner, Healey, & 
Sewell, 2008).  
In support of the metarepresentational theory, Perner, Mauer, and Hildenbrand (2011) 
demonstrated a link between false belief reasoning and identity understanding. In the “lost-
and-found” task, a figure in plain clothes is introduced to the child by his profession (e.g., 
“this is the firefighter”) and is immediately hidden from sight. A boy then enters the scene, 
carrying an item that he thinks someone might have lost. The boy is told the name of the 
figure who lost the item (e.g., “Mr. Müller”), after which the key identity statement – “Mr. 
Müller is the firefighter” – is provided. The child is then shown two figures – the one that 
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was introduced at the beginning of the story, and another, unfamiliar figure – and is asked to 
identify the owner of the item. In line with the sense-reference distinction, a correct answer 
demonstrated the child’s understanding that the two labels (“Mr. Müller” and “the 
firefighter”) refer to the same figure. In testing children ranging from 3 to 5 years of age, 
Perner et al. found a significant correlation between performance on the lost-and-found task 
and performance on the false belief task; even when chronological and verbal age were 
controlled for, younger 3-year-olds were more likely to fail both tasks, and 4- and 5-year-olds 
were more likely to pass both. The authors interpreted the association between identity 
understanding and false belief reasoning as evidence for a common underlying 
metarepresentational capacity, which develops later in childhood (Perner et al., 2011).  
Crucially, Perner et al. (2011) have claimed that the lost-and-found task is void of 
performance demands and thus provides a pure measure of identity understanding. However, 
note that in the task the child is given two labels for the same figure – one when it is in sight 
(“the firefighter”), and one when it is not (“Mr. Müller”). Evidence from the literature on 
language acquisition has shown that young children are biased to assume that labels are 
mutually exclusive; that is, they assume that objects only have one label, and will consider a 
newly introduced label as referring to a novel object (Markman & Wachtel, 1988). The lost-
and-found task thus appears to be structured in such a way that children are lead to assume 
that the two labels refer to two different figures. The identity statement (“Mr. Müller is the 
firefighter”) appears against the background of this pragmatic implication, creating a conflict 
that the child must resolve in order to provide a correct response.  
The current investigation proposes that it is the resolution of this conflict, rather than 
identity understanding itself, which accounts for performance on Perner et al.’s (2011) lost-
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and-found task. To test this claim, we implemented a “no-conflict” version of the lost-and-
found task, in which the identity statement is provided earlier in the narrative (between the 
two labels), thereby eliminating the assumption of mutual exclusivity. If the lost-and-found 
task were free of performance demands, then the removal of this assumption (but 
preservation of the identity statement) should have no effect on performance. That is, 
children should exhibit the same performance pattern on the no-conflict version as on the 
“standard” version of the lost-and-found task. A correlation among all three tasks would 
support Perner et al.’s argument for a shared reliance on metarepresentational ability. On the 
other hand, the current investigation hypothesizes that performance will be higher on the no-
conflict version, compared to both the standard version of the lost-and-found task and the 
false belief task. Demonstration of this performance pattern would lend evidence to the 
existence of a performance demand within the standard lost-and-found task, and would 
further call into question the shared reliance on metarepresentational ability. 
II. Methods 
A. Participants 
A total of fifty-four children (27 boys, 27 girls) ranging from 3 to 5 years of age were 
recruited from and tested on-site at three preschools in Santa Barbara, California. Nine 
children (3 boys, 6 girls) were excluded from the data set: four because they failed to 
complete the battery of tasks, and five (2 boys, 3 girls) because they missed at least one 
control question in the false belief task. The final analysis thus included forty-five children 
(24 boys, 21 girls), who were divided into a younger “3-year old” group (n = 19, mean age = 
41 months, SD = 2.7), and an older “4- to 5-year old” group (n = 26, mean age = 55 months, 
SD = 4.0). 
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B. Design 
Using a repeated measures design, all children received a battery of five tasks: a false 
belief task, two versions of standard lost-and-found task replicated from Perner et al. (2011), 
and two versions of the “no conflict” lost-and-found task, which was identical to the 
replicated task in all aspects save the location of the identity statement within the narrative. 
The order of task administration was counterbalanced across participants.  
C. Materials 
 All tasks were administered as animated narratives, which were created in Microsoft 
PowerPoint using Playmobil® figures and presented to participants on an 11.6” laptop. The 
animations were designed such that experimenters could narrate the story, pause it to ask 
questions, and continue once the child provided a response. As in Perner et al. (2011), the 
current study employed four versions of the lost-and-found task, which varied in terms of the 
name and profession of the man, the building (which corresponded to the man’s profession), 
the name of the boy, the item found, and the animal outside of the building (Table 1). The 
versions were identical to one another in all other respects. Each participant received all four 
versions – two for the standard identity condition and two for the no-conflict identity 
condition. Version order was counterbalanced across conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Procedure 
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Children were tested individually, in an area separated from their main classroom to 
avoid distraction. At the start of each session, the child was brought into the testing area 
and seated at a table across from a laptop computer. One experimenter administered the 
tasks, while a second experimenter sat to the side and recorded the child’s responses. For 
the duration of the session, no feedback was provided as to whether the child provided a 
correct or incorrect response. Sessions employed all five tasks and lasted between 10 and 
15 minutes. After completing the tasks, the child was thanked and walked back to the 
classroom.  
1. False Belief Task 
Each child received one false belief task, which was modeled after Wimmer and Perner 
(1983). 
a. Control Questions 
Children were asked a number of control questions throughout the task to ensure their 
comprehension of the narrative. The story opened by introducing two characters – Sara, 
shown holding a ball and standing next to a green box, and Max, shown standing next to a 
blue box. After a few seconds, Sara placed her ball in the green box and left the scene. The 
experimenter then asked the first control question: “Where did Sara put the ball?” [correct = 
green box]. Once Sara had gone, Max removed the ball from the green box, put it into the 
blue box, and left the scene. The experimenter then asked the control questions: “Where is 
the ball now?” [correct = blue box], “Who put it there?” [correct = Max], and “Did Sara see 
that?” [correct = no].  
 
b. Test Questions  
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After Max left, Sara entered the scene again, wishing to retrieve her ball. The 
prediction question was then asked: “Where will Sara look for the ball first?” [correct = 
green box]. Sara looked in the green box, which was shown to be empty, and the 
experimenter asked the explanation question: “Why did Sara look for the ball in the green 
box?” 
c. Scoring 
Children who could not answer all of the control questions correctly were excluded 
from the final analysis. Children passed the prediction question if they accurately stated 
where Sara would look for her ball. As in Perner et al. (2011), criteria for passing the 
explanation question were modeled after Wimmer & Mayringer (1998). Correct responses 
indicated either the original location of the ball, or that Sara was absent, did not see Max 
move the ball, or did not know that the ball had been moved. Incorrect responses described 
the true location of the ball, expressed Sara’s desire to find the ball, or took some form of “I 
don’t know.”  
2. Lost-and-Found Tasks 
Children were given two versions each of the standard and no-conflict conditions. 
Table 2 describes the presentation of the control and test questions in each condition.  
a. Standard Condition 
This condition was directly replicated from Perner et al.’s (2011) lost-and-found task. 
At the beginning of the task, a dog was shown standing next to a building (in this example, a 
fire station). A man in plain clothes entered the scene, was introduced to the child as “the 
firefighter,” and went into the station. A boy then entered, carrying a bag he had found 
somewhere. He asked the dog whose bag it is, and the dog answered that it belongs to “Mr. 
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Smith.” The dog then provided the identity statement: “Mr. Smith is the firefighter.” After 
hearing this, the boy walked up to the station and rang the doorbell. Two men in plain clothes 
answered: the one who was introduced at the beginning of the narrative, and another, 
unfamiliar man. The child was then asked the test question, “Whose bag is it?” and was 
required to answer by pointing to one of the figures.  
b. No-conflict Condition 
The no-conflict condition was exactly matched to the standard identity condition, 
except for two features. First, to preserve the structure of the identity statement across 
conditions, here the figure was initially introduced using a proper name (“Mr. Smith”) and 
later described in terms of his profession (“the firefighter”).1 Additionally, and crucially to 
our study, the identity statement (“Mr. Smith is the firefighter”) was presented between these 
two labels, such that by the time the boy in the narrative was told that the bag belonged to the 
firefighter, the child had already been informed that “Mr. Smith” and “the firefighter” refer to 
the same figure.  
c. Scoring  
 Children who could not answer all of the control questions correctly were excluded 
from the final analysis. In both the standard and no-conflict condition, children passed if they 
correctly pointed to the owner of the item. 
 
 
                                                        
1 In designing the no-conflict condition, preservation of the narrative’s structure necessitated either: 1) using the 
proper name as the initial label (e.g., “This is Mr. Smith” instead of “This is the firefighter”), or 2) reversing the 
order of labels in the identity statement (e.g., “The firefighter is Mr. Smith” instead of “Mr. Smith is the 
firefighter”). In either case, reversal of label presentation would have occurred at some point in the narrative; 
we chose to preserve the identity statement. This reversal could not have imposed an additional performance 
demand in the no-conflict condition without imposing the same demand on the standard identity condition as 
originally implemented by Perner et al. (2011). 
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III. Results 
For the standard and no-conflict lost-and-found tasks, children were required to provide 
correct responses to the target question on both trials to be considered as passing either 
condition. For the false belief task, children were required to provide correct responses to 
both the prediction and explanation questions.2 The impression given by Figure 1 is that a 
difference in performance across tasks emerges in the 4-year-old group. However, age effects 
were not significant for either the standard identity condition (χ² (1, N = 45) = 1.52, p > .10) 
or the false belief task (χ² (1, N = 45) = 0.53, p > .50). In contrast, performance on the no-
conflict identity condition increased significantly as a function of age (χ² (1, N = 45) = 15.50, 
p < .001).  
                                                        
2 : The analyses in Perner et al. (2011) only included responses to the prediction question. In contrast, the 
current study combined responses to the prediction and explanation questions to enable comparison of scores on 
the false belief task to scores on the two lost-and-found tasks; in this way, the child’s score for each task was 
based on two trials. Analysis revealed no significant difference in difficulty between the explanation and 
prediction questions. Moreover, excluding responses to the explanation question from the analysis did not affect 
the results reported here. 
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A. Performance on the Two Lost-and-Found Tasks 
In examining the younger group, a large proportion of children failed both conditions 
(42%), while a small proportion passed both (5%). Comparative performance increased in the 
older group, with no children failing both conditions, and a larger proportion passing both 
(38%). To assess the relative difficulty of each task in each age group, binomial chi-squared 
analyses compared the number of children who passed one task and failed the other to the 
number of children who showed the reverse pattern. Younger children were equally likely 
(26% in each direction) to pass the no-conflict condition and fail the standard condition, as 
they were to pass the standard condition and fail the no-conflict condition (McNemar’s χ² (1, 
N = 19) = 0.97, p > .50). In contrast, a significant performance difference emerged in the 
older group: 50% of children passed the no-conflict condition and failed the standard 
condition, and 12% passed the standard condition and failed the no-conflict condition 
(McNemar’s χ² (1, N = 26) = 4.55, p = .021). Taken together, these results suggest that the 
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no-conflict condition is indeed easier than the standard identity condition, which supports our 
hypothesis that a performance demand is present in the latter.  
To assess the association between the two conditions, a logistic regression analysis was 
run using performance on the standard identity condition as the dependent variable and 
performance on the no-conflict condition as the predictor variable. Analysis revealed that 
performance on the no-conflict identity condition did not significantly predict performance 
on the standard identity condition (χ² = 0.61, p > .10), even when age was controlled for (χ² = 
0.23, p > .10) 
B. Performance on the Standard Identity Condition and the False Belief Task 
The younger group demonstrated generally low performance on the standard identity 
condition and the false belief task, with a large proportion failing both tasks (53%), and a 
small proportion passing both (5%). Performance increased in the older group, with fewer 
children failing both tasks (15%), and a more children passing both (35%). Binomial chi-
squared analyses revealed a slight but non-significant tendency for younger children to pass 
the standard identity condition and fail the false belief task (26%) rather than pass the false 
belief task and fail the standard identity condition (16%) (McNemar’s χ² (1, N = 19) = 0.11, p 
> .50). In the older group as well, more children passed the identity condition and failed the 
false belief task (35%) than the reverse pattern (15%). However, this difference was also 
non-significant (McNemar’s χ² (1, N = 26) = .01, p > .10).  
The apparent closeness in difficulty across age groups suggests that the two tasks share 
a common underlying ability. To test this possibility, a logistic regression was computed 
using performance on the false belief task as the dependent variable and performance on the 
standard identity condition as the predictor variable. In contrast to the results from Perner et 
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al. (2011), our analysis revealed that the two tasks were not significantly correlated (χ² =.002, 
p = > .50), indicating that performance on the standard identity condition did not 
significantly predict performance on the false belief task, and lending evidence to the 
hypothesis that different underlying abilities drive the performance rates on each task. This 
pattern held even when age was controlled for (χ² =.032, p = > .50). 
C. Performance on the No-Conflict Identity Condition and the False Belief Task 
In examining the younger group, comparative performance between the no-conflict 
identity condition and the false belief task was consistent with previous analyses; the 
majority of younger children failed both tasks (53%), while a small proportion passed both 
(5%). Performance increased in the older group with fewer children failing both tasks (8%), 
and more children passing both (27%). In terms of relative task difficulty, analyses revealed a 
slight, non-significant tendency for younger children to pass the no-conflict condition and 
fail the false belief task (26%) rather than pass the false belief task and fail the no-conflict 
condition (16%) (McNemar’s χ² (1, N = 19) = 0.10, p > .50). A significant difference was 
revealed in the older group: 64% of children passed the no-conflict condition and failed the 
false belief task, and 4% passed the false belief task and failed the no-conflict condition 
(McNemar’s χ² (1, N = 26) = 0.01, p < .001). 
Once again, a logistic regression analysis was run to assess the association between the 
two tasks. Using performance on the false belief task as the dependent variable and 
performance on the no-conflict condition as the predictor variable, the analysis showed that 
performance on the no-conflict condition did not significantly predict performance on the 
false belief task (χ² = 0.04, p > .50); this was the case even when age was controlled for (χ² = 
0.26, p > .50).  
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IV. Discussion 
The aim of the current investigation was to examine the possibility that a performance 
demand, rather than a lack of metarepresentational ability, influenced performance on a 
measure of identity understanding. We implemented a standard false belief task, the lost-and-
found task as described in Perner et al. (2011), and an additional “no-conflict” version of the 
lost-and-found task, which was identical to the original version in all respects save the 
location of the key identity statement within the narrative. The results support our hypothesis 
that performance demands in the lost-and-found task are responsible for the pattern observed 
in Perner et al. While task performance was uniformly low in the younger group, differences 
emerged across the older group, revealing a significantly higher rate of passing the no-
conflict condition compared to the standard condition. From this we can infer that the no-
conflict condition was much easier than the standard condition. Beyond this, the absence of a 
significant correlation between the two conditions suggests that they are indexing different 
abilities. 
The relationship between identity and false belief understanding is further called into 
question by our failure to replicate the correlation found in Perner et al. (2011). Though we 
found a common level of difficulty between the two tasks, the absence of a significant 
correlation strongly suggests a difference in underlying ability. Evidence for this is further 
bolstered by performance on the no-conflict identity condition, which was not correlated with 
performance on either task. It is entirely likely that the tasks contain different performance 
demands. While previous studies have implicated the selection processor in false belief tasks 
(see, e.g., Friedman & Leslie, 2004), the current investigation suggests that failure on the 
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standard lost-and-found task is caused by the need to resolve a conflict instigated by an 
assumption of mutual exclusivity.  
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